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Abstract
Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV [SARS-COV-2]) was detected in humans during the last week
of December 2019 at Wuhan city in China, and caused 24 554 cases in 27 countries and ter-
ritories as of 5 February 2020. The objective of this study was to estimate the risk of transmis-
sion of 2019-nCoV through human passenger air flight from four major cities of China
(Wuhan, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) to the passengers’ destination countries. We
extracted the weekly simulated passengers’ end destination data for the period of 1–31
January 2020 from FLIRT, an online air travel dataset that uses information from 800 airlines
to show the direct flight and passengers’ end destination. We estimated a risk index of 2019-
nCoV transmission based on the number of travellers to destination countries, weighted by
the number of confirmed cases of the departed city reported by the World Health
Organization (WHO). We ranked each country based on the risk index in four quantiles
(4th quantile being the highest risk and 1st quantile being the lowest risk). During the period,
388 287 passengers were destined for 1297 airports in 168 countries or territories across the
world. The risk index of 2019-nCoV among the countries had a very high correlation with
the WHO-reported confirmed cases (0.97). According to our risk score classification, of
the countries that reported at least one Coronavirus-infected pneumonia (COVID-19) case
as of 5 February 2020, 24 countries were in the 4th quantile of the risk index, two in the
3rd quantile, one in the 2nd quantile and none in the 1st quantile. Outside China, countries
with a higher risk of 2019-nCoV transmission are Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Canada
and the USA, all of which reported at least one case. In pan-Europe, UK, France, Russia,
Germany and Italy; in North America, USA and Canada; in Oceania, Australia had high
risk, all of them reported at least one case. In Africa and South America, the risk of transmis-
sion is very low with Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt, Mauritius and Brazil showing a similar
risk of transmission compared to the risk of any of the countries where at least one case is
detected. The risk of transmission on 31 January 2020 was very high in neighbouring
Asian countries, followed by Europe (UK, France, Russia and Germany), Oceania
(Australia) and North America (USA and Canada). Increased public health response includ-
ing early case recognition, isolation of identified case, contract tracing and targeted airport
screening, public awareness and vigilance of health workers will help mitigate the force of fur-
ther spread to naïve countries.
Introduction
On 31 December 2019, local hospitals in Wuhan, China reported that they had detected a ser-
ies of cases of Novel Coronavirus-infected pneumonia to the World Health Organization
(WHO) [1]. On 7 January, the causative agent was identified by the Chinese Centre for
Disease Control and Prevention as a Novel Coronavirus and designated ‘2019-nCoV’ and
finally as "SARS-COV-2". Epidemiological investigations identified the local Huanan seafood
wet market as the location of an initial exposure event [2]. The market was closed on 31
December 2019 [2, 3] and wildlife market activity was banned countrywide. Despite travel
restrictions to and from the city imposed by Chinese authorities to limit the potential disper-
sion of the virus beyond the region [4, 5], international cases continue to be reported.
As of 5 February 2020, there were 24 554 confirmed Novel Coronavirus-infected pneumo-
nia (COVID-19) cases in 27 countries or territories, of which 24 363 (99.2%) were within
mainland China [6]. The locations of internationally imported cases are consistent with risk
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models generated from flight data out of Wuhan city.
Transmission from mildly symptomatic (i.e. cough, lethargy,
myalgia) infected individuals was identified early in the course
of this outbreak, with human-to-human transmission detected
in international case series [7].
The timing of this outbreak around the lunar new year widely
celebrated in China coincides with a period of highest annual
human movement patterns in the region and between China
and globally [8], increasing the potential for rapid geographic dis-
persal of the infection. Further, recent investment in the African
continent by the Chinese state and private investors has led to an
increasing Chinese diaspora [9] and a greater number of direct
and indirect flight connections to the African continent from
China [10].
There are few studies available on global risk of 2019-nCoV
spread [4, 5, 11]. Bogoch et al. [5] and Chinazzi et al. [11] esti-
mated the risk of importation of 2019-nCoV from major
Chinese cities to the most frequent international destinations.
Wu et al. estimated the risk of international spread compared
to domestic outbound flights [4]. These articles do not model
the cumulative risk of importation of 2019-nCoV in a country
and instead focus on specific points of entry. Here, we considered
all the end destinations of flights from four important cities of
China involving 168 countries/territories around the world and
calculated the total risk of transmission into a country by aggre-
gating the risk associated with all the entry airports of the country.
We further looked in more detail at the risk to Africa where the
health infrastructure would be challenged tracking a new epi-
demic across its 54 countries.
The aim of the current study was to explore the effect of sus-
tained transmission from the four Chinese cities of Wuhan,
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou on international disease
importation risk to 168 countries and territories, with a specific
focus on Africa where current levels of healthcare infrastructure
could provide a significant challenge for managing this novel
epidemic.
Methods
Data
We extracted modelled flight data for the final destination of pas-
sengers travelling from four Chinese cities (including domestic
and international destinations) from the FLIRT database
[12, 13]. FLIRT was designed to predict the flow and likely destin-
ation of infected travellers through the air travel network. It uses a
database of flight schedules from over 800 airlines and displays
direct flight connections in addition to a modelled end destination
(three-letter IATA code for airports). Flight connection data and
passenger numbers are based on the data collected since October
2014 [12]. We extracted the simulated passenger’s data for each
week for the period of 1 January to 31 January 2020 from four
major Chinese cities: Wuhan, Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangzhou. The simulation can process up to 20 000 passengers’
information for a particular time frame from any city (including
surrounding airports). We collected the reported 2019-nCoV case
data from the WHO’s daily situation update website [14].
Estimation of risk of transmission
To estimate the relative risk of 2019-nCoV transmission, we con-
sidered all infected passengers who travelled between 1 January
and 31 January to possess a maximum risk of transmission 1
(and no infected passengers means no risk) and estimated the
relative risk of each country based on the number of passengers
who travelled from each of the four cities. Thus countries with
a higher number of passengers travelling from any of these cities
had a higher risk of transmission. We then weighted the risk esti-
mated for each city with the number of reported infected people
in each city by 31 January 2020 [14] and estimated the mean aver-
age risk of transmission termed as ‘Risk index’ which follows the
equation below:
Risk index (x) =
∑N
n=1
P (x)n
Pn
× In
Cn
,
where x is the destination country, Risk index (x) is the risk of
infection importation in country x, P(x)n is the number of passen-
gers to country x from city n, Pn is the total number of passengers
who left city n, In is the number of infected people in city n and
Cn is the population size of city n. The risk index denotes the risk
of at least one case being imported into a country or territory
where 1 means an absolute certainty and 0 means no risk at all.
Our model assumed that there is no case outside China and
thus ignored if any country already had imported case(s). In
countries where 2019-nCoV is already detected, the risk index
would explain the risk of importing additional infected indivi-
duals from China.
We performed a Pearson correlation coefficient test between
the risk index of the country and the WHO’s reported case num-
ber from the country. We grouped the countries in four quantiles
based on the risk index where high-risk countries were grouped as
the 4th (>75th percentiles) and the 3rd (>50th to ⩽75th percentiles)
quantiles and low-risk countries were grouped as the 2nd (>25th
to ⩽50th percentiles) and the 1st (⩽25th percentile) quantiles
(Table 1).
Results
We modelled 388 287 passengers travelling to 1297 airports in 168
countries or territories. The risk index of 2019-nCoV for these
countries is presented in Figure 1. A regularly updated risk map
is hosted on PANDORA’s website ( https://ncovdata.io/import/).
Outside China, the countries with the highest risk of
2019-nCoV transmission from our model were Thailand,
Cambodia, Malaysia, Canada and the USA, all of which have
reported at least one case. Among the top 25 countries identified
with the highest risk of 2019-nCoV transmission (Fig. 2), all
countries except four (Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and Qatar)
have detected at least one case as of 5 February 2020 (Table 1).
According to our risk score classification, of the countries that
reported at least one 2019-nCoV case as of 5 February 2020, 24
countries were in the 4th quantile of the risk index, two
(Sweden and Belgium) in the 3rd quantile, one (Nepal) in the
2nd quantile and none in the 1st quantile [14]. Asian and
European countries are dominant in the 3rd and 4th quantile
(high-risk index) while African and South American Countries
are the majority in the 1st and 2nd quantiles (low-risk index)
(Table 1). Out of 43 countries in the 4th quantile, 22 were from
Asia and 13 from Pan-Europe, whereas in the 1st quantile, 19
out of 42 countries were from Africa (Table 1).
The overall risk of transmission of the virus into Africa is low.
However, Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt and Mauritius have a
2 Najmul Haider et al.
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Table 1. The list of countries or territories based on their risk index in different quantiles for 2019-nCoV (SARS-COV-2) transmission
4th Quantile risk index (highest risk) 3rd Quantile risk index 2nd Quantile risk index 1st Quantile risk index (lowest risk)
Sl/Rank Country Risk index Country Risk index Country Risk index Country Risk index
1 China 0.609603126 Sweden 0.000320248 Kenya 3.53 × 10−05 Jamaica 3.84 × 10−06
2 Thailand 0.099432816 Laos 0.000296262 Peru 3.18 × 10−05 Serbia 3.22 × 10−06
3 Cambodia 0.05294058 Brazil 0.00027186 Algeria 3.11 × 10−05 Togo 2.73 × 10−06
4 Malaysia 0.041899039 Denmark 0.000254904 French Polynesia 3.07 × 10−05 Uganda 2.71 × 10−06
5 Canada 0.02730388 Oman 0.000248884 Iceland 3.00 × 10−05 Tonga 2.69 × 10−06
6 USA 0.021169936 Israel 0.000221865 Samoa 2.74 × 10−05 The Bahamas 2.39 × 10−06
7 Japan 0.01479856 Ukraine 0.000209515 Tanzania 2.73 × 10−05 Cote d’Ivoire 2.02 × 10−06
8 India 0.010256629 Poland 0.0002 Palau 2.63 × 10−05 Suriname 2.01 × 10−06
9 UK 0.008786839 Brunei 0.000181028 Djibouti 2.45 × 10−05 Vanuatu 1.99 × 10−06
10 South Korea 0.008072566 Czech Republic 0.000179806 Belarus 2.40 × 10−05 Albania 1.90 × 10−06
11 Vietnam 0.007928803 Northern Mariana
Islands
0.000177972 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2.40 × 10−05 Malta 1.73 × 10−06
12 Singapore 0.007784474 Belgium 0.000175566 Cook Islands 2.26 × 10−05 Guinea 1.60 × 10−06
13 Hong Kong 0.007636714 Maldives 0.000172453 Colombia 1.94 × 10−05 Namibia 1.55 × 10−06
14 Indonesia 0.007197131 Norway 0.000171441 Papua New
Guinea
1.88 × 10−05 Democratic
Republic of Congo
1.41 × 10−06
15 United Arab
Emirates
0.007089607 Kuwait 0.000166929 Nigeria 1.85 × 10−05 Rwanda 1.22 × 10−06
16 France 0.006814962 Egypt 0.000139373 Jordan 1.83 × 10−05 Honduras 1.02 × 10−06
17 Turkey 0.00568808 Iran 0.000137181 Cuba 1.79 × 10−05 Gabon 8.98 × 10−07
18 Australia 0.005671745 Mongolia 0.000132319 Argentina 1.70 × 10−05 Republic of Congo 7.22 × 10−07
19 Russia 0.005592859 Chile 0.000129975 Tunisia 1.65 × 10−05 Bermuda 5.99 × 10−07
20 Pakistan 0.004811284 North Korea 0.000128562 Ghana 1.61 × 10−05 Antigua and
Barbuda
3.52 × 10−07
21 Qatar 0.004113225 Mauritius 0.000126679 Armenia 1.53 × 10−05 Barbados 3.52 × 10−07
22 Macau 0.003373727 Portugal 0.000113251 Dominican
Republic
1.46 × 10−05 Cape Verde 3.52 × 10−07
23 Germany 0.003176858 Uzbekistan 9.67 × 10−05 New Caledonia 1.34 × 10−05 Guyana 3.52 × 10−07
24 Italy 0.002753413 Hungary 8.97 × 10−05 Cyprus 1.29 × 10−05 Madagascar 2.99 × 10−07
25 Philippines 0.002740638 Azerbaijan 8.64 × 10−05 Bhutan 1.25 × 10−05 Grenada 2.47 × 10−07
26 Taiwan 0.002590034 Croatia 8.57 × 10−05 Nepal 1.25 × 10−05 Bolivia 1.76 × 10−07
27 Belize 0.002009996 Tajikistan 8.50 × 10−05 Slovenia 1.24 × 10−05 Burkina Faso 1.76 × 10−07
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Table 1. (Continued.)
4th Quantile risk index (highest risk) 3rd Quantile risk index 2nd Quantile risk index 1st Quantile risk index (lowest risk)
Sl/Rank Country Risk index Country Risk index Country Risk index Country Risk index
28 Ethiopia 0.001469205 Bahrain 6.31 × 10−05 Moldova 1.22 × 10−05 Cameroon 1.76 × 10−07
29 Finland 0.001307074 Fiji 6.29 × 10−05 Kosovo 1.21 × 10−05 Chad 1.76 × 10−07
30 Sri Lanka 0.001179859 Kyrgyzstan 6.22 × 10−05 Zambia 1.20 × 10−05 Mozambique 1.76 × 10−07
31 The Netherlands 0.000980799 Afghanistan 6.16 × 10−05 El Salvador 1.05 × 10−05 Paraguay 1.76 × 10−07
32 New Zealand 0.000971254 Panama 5.91 × 10−05 Romania 7.56 × 10−06 Solomon Islands 1.76 × 10−07
33 Greece 0.000958209 Morocco 5.60 × 10−05 Guatemala 6.92 × 10−06 Syria 1.76 × 10−07
34 Bangladesh 0.000831196 Iraq 5.54 × 10−05 Angola 6.77 × 10−06 Uruguay 1.76 × 10−07
35 Myanmar 0.000803755 Bulgaria 5.07 × 10−05 Costa Rica 6.41 × 10−06 Venezuela 1.76 × 10−07
36 Saudi Arabia 0.000750981 Lithuania 4.99 × 10−05 Trinidad and
Tobago
6.13 × 10−06 Zimbabwe 1.76 × 10−07
37 Spain 0.000564876 Seychelles 4.82 × 10−05 Sudan 5.66 × 10−06 Libya 1.23 × 10−07
38 Switzerland 0.00056232 Lebanon 4.47 × 10−05 Ecuador 5.56 × 10−06 Macedonia 1.23 × 10−07
39 Austria 0.000498664 Georgia 4.37 × 10−05 Puerto Rico 4.68 × 10−06 Saint Lucia 1.23 × 10−07
40 South Africa 0.000468876 Latvia 4.06 × 10−05 Turkmenistan 4.42 × 10−06 Sierra Leone 1.23 × 10−07
41 Kazakhstan 0.000443175 Luxembourg 3.80 × 10−05 Mauritania 4.09 × 10−06 Somalia 1.23 × 10−07
42 Ireland 0.000371199 Estonia 3.69 × 10−05 Timor-Leste 1.23 × 10−07
43 Mexico 0.000322198
44
Number of
countries/territories:
168
Africa: 2 Africa: 3 Africa: 11 Africa: 19
Asian: 22 Asian: 16 Asian: 4 Asian: 2
Pan-Europe:13 Pan-Europe: 18 Pan-Europe: 9 Pan-Europe: 4
North America: 4 North America: 0 North America: 3 North America: 7
Oceania: 2 Oceania: 2 Oceania: 6 Oceania: 3
South America: 0 South America: 3 South America: 8 South America: 7
Total: 43 Total: 42 Total: 41 Total: 42
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similar risk score as countries where at least one case was
detected. In South America, only Brazil has a similar or greater
risk than countries currently reporting cases. In North America,
both the USA and Canada have high risk and had imported
cases reported early in the outbreak. Australia and New Zealand
have risk similar to the countries where at least one case is
detected. Although there are few direct flights from China to
African destinations, a large number of indirect flights operate
via Dubai, an international airport hub in the United Arab
Emirates.
The correlation coefficient between the estimated risk index of
the countries and the WHO-reported confirmed cases was 0.97.
Discussion
Our analysis showed a high risk of transmission of 2019-nCoV
through air flights from four Chinese cities to neighbouring
Asian countries. The risk of 2019-nCoV (SARS-COV-2) transmis-
sion was relatively low in Africa and South America. Several coun-
tries in both North America and Oceania showed high risk with
these countries reporting at least one case of 2019-nCoV. Our risk
index showed a very high correlation with the WHO’s reported
COVID-19 cases.
China has four times as many air passengers now than it had
during SARS outbreaks in 2003. A large number of workers now
travel internationally where China is heavily investing in infra-
structure development in Africa, parts of Asia and Latin
America. A significant and mobile Chinese population live in
Europe and North America alongside an increasing amount of
Chinese tourism. This travel poses a high risk of 2019-nCoV trav-
elling across international borders. Although acquiring a case is
low for these countries, the consequences are likely to be higher
because of the country’s capacity to control such situations [15].
Fig. 1. The map with the risk index of countries or territories with 2019-nCoV (SARS-COV-2) infection (0-1). The darker colour indicates higher risk and light blue
colour indicates the absence of data. In general, China and neighbouring countries have a higher risk of transmission of 2019-nCoV infection. Africa and South
America generally have a low risk of transmission. Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt, Mauritius and Brazil have a similar risk of transmission to countries where at
least one case has been detected. For example, the risk index of 0.1 for Thailand indicates that based on travel patterns observed during 1–31 January 2020
from four major cities of China, Thailand has 10% risk of importing a 2019-nCoV-infected person from China.
Fig. 2. Chart showing the relative risk of countries outside China being exposed to
coronavirus ( SARS-COV-2) transmission. The second Y-axis indicates the number of
confirmed COVID-19 cases reported by the WHO as of 5 February 2020. Twenty-one
of the top 25 at-risk countries (except Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and Qatar)
reported at least one COVID-19 case by 5 February 2020.
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Based on our model, the countries with the highest risk index
but have not reported any case of 2019-nCoV as yet are Indonesia,
Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar and Ethiopia. These countries are at risk
and they should be the priorities for investment in case detection
and airport screening. Compared to the SARS outbreak of 2003,
the situation in 2020 differs due to the increased frequency and
volume of international air travel.
During these early stages of the epidemic, case numbers have
doubled on average every 7.4 days with an estimated basic reproduc-
tion number (R0) of 2.2 (1.4–3.9) [1]. Although the data so far sug-
gest that the disease is mild in most cases and that the case fatality
rate is currently reported to be lower than SARS or MERS, the situ-
ation is likely to go on for months and could cause severe disruption
in countries that are not well prepared. Hence countries ranked as
high risk in our model (4th and 3rd quantiles) should take all
steps necessary to ensure prompt detection of cases and the capacity
to manage these cases to prevent ongoing spread. International
investment needs to be directed especially to countries with limited
healthcare and public health surveillance capacity to enable the
detection of cases and disease control [16, 17]
Our estimation showed a lower risk of transmission in Africa
and South America. Nevertheless, low and middle countries on
these continents are more likely to see the ongoing spread and
major disruption from the introduction of a single case, even if
the risk of importation is lower. Direct flights between Chinese
cities and African countries are few which has contributed to a
lower estimated risk of 2019-nCoV transmission. As of 5
February 2020, five cases have been reported from the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) which acts as an important travel hub for
onward journeys to the African continent. Implementation of
mildly symptomatic passenger screening in the UAE may reduce
the potential for 2019-nCoV to enter Africa. Screening and diag-
nostic capacity in Africa has been supported by a rapid grant from
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to the African CDC, miti-
gating the consequences of an importation.
The current situation is extremely dynamic and since then
some countries have instigated flight restrictions and closed
borders (e.g. Russia). These decisions were relevant for these
locations but not based on probabilities. WHO has not recom-
mended a cessation of transportation to free countries but sug-
gested preventive measures. This would seem appropriate for
Africa and South America with the caveat that only one case is
needed to initiate a local epidemic without proper biosecurity
and quarantine measures, whilst other regions will need to decide
on a case-by-case basis through appropriate risk assessment.
Our study has several limitations. We considered flights from
four cities of China, three of which (Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangzhou) are ranked among top five busiest airports (based
on the number of flights) in China and Wuhan as the site of ori-
gin of outbreaks. While including further cities in our analysis
would have added further information, Beijing and Shanghai
cover most of the international destinations to which other air-
ports are connected. Further, we have adjusted for the number
of reported cases in each departure. When developing the
model, we initially explored using only Wuhan as the departure
airport, the rank of top 10 at-risk countries remained the same.
Thus our findings are still representative of the total risk posed
by other airports or cities. We did not consider the risk associated
with the travel route through water and land which might have an
impact in the spread of 2019-nCoV. Another limitation is that the
model does not account for travel patterns in other affected coun-
tries. For example, some cases have started acquiring the disease
outside of China: the third case notified in the UK acquired the
disease in Singapore. However overall, the risk compared with
the risk of acquisition in China is very low, therefore it probably
would not change the order of countries.
Conclusion
The risk of transmission of SARS-COV-2 from China on 31
January 2020 was highest to neighbouring countries in Asia
(Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia), followed by Europe (UK,
France, Russia and Germany), Oceania (Australia and New
Zealand) and North America (USA and Canada). The situation
is dynamic and may have changed with the closure of flights and
borders since this analysis was done. The higher correlation coeffi-
cient with travellers and case detection data indicate that
2019-nCoV will remain a significant threat from the air-borne
movement of people. The authors suggest an ongoing risk-based
approach to the prioritisation of and investment by international
and national agencies and authorities, in emergency interventions
for the prevention of movement of 2019-nCoV (SARS-COV-
2) through human travel. This is achieved by appropriate actions
at high-risk points of departure and at highly used ports of entry
from these infected zones. Closure of certain routes, targeted air-
port screening, risk communication, public awareness and targeted
training and vigilance of health workers associated with the portals
of entry of visitors to their countries will help mitigate the force of
further spread of 2019-nCoV.
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